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Rapoport A. — N-person game theory: Concepts and Applications |
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Предметный указатель |
Game(s), dual 213
Game(s), dual-homogeneous 219
Game(s), essential (inessential) 83
Game(s), essential (inessential), characteristic function of 85
Game(s), essential (inessential), constant-sum 85 115
Game(s), homogeneous 218
Game(s), improper 211—212
Game(s), in extensive form 54 57 64 67—68
Game(s), in normal form 58—59 61 65 67 70 73
Game(s), logical structure of 63
Game(s), multiplication of 214
Game(s), N-person, constant-sum 138
Game(s), N-person, experiments in 254
Game(s), N-person, fundamental theorem of n313
Game(s), N-person, solution of 95 172
Game(s), negotiated 161
Game(s), non-constant-sum 64—65 87 309
Game(s), non-cooperative 158
Game(s), non-zerosum 63—64 81 see constant-sum non-constant-sum" "Three-person" "Two-person"
Game(s), non-zerosum, symmetric zerosum 223
Game(s), non-zerosum, zerosum 60—61 63—64 66 68 165
Game(s), not "solvable" 65 n313
Game(s), not strong 218 n315
Game(s), null 210—211
Game(s), of chance 48 see
Game(s), of complete opposition n312
Game(s), of strategy 45
Game(s), parlor 60 64 see etc."
Game(s), product 214
Game(s), pure bargaining 210—211 216
Game(s), quota 124 133 222 229 232 309
Game(s), quota, with even number of players 229
Game(s), rules of the 53—54 57—58 137
Game(s), settlements 67
Game(s), simple 207 213 227 289 309
Game(s), simple, as product game 218
Game(s), solution of 62 65 92 155 see "Solutions" "Von
Game(s), strategic structure of 84 294 309
Game(s), strategically equivalent 258
Game(s), strong 210 215 n315
Game(s), super 217
Game(s), symmetric 112 172 222 293 298 309
Game(s), terminal rule of 53 n312
Game(s), Three-person Prisoners Dilemma 148—149 153 176
Game(s), Three-person Prisoners Dilemma, solution of 151
Game(s), Three-person, characteristic function of 90
Game(s), Three-person, constant-sum 85—86 100 115 119 221
Game(s), Three-person, constant-sum in normalized form 99
Game(s), Three-person, constant-sum in partition function form 152
Game(s), Three-person, essential 86
Game(s), Three-person, non-constant-sum 106
Game(s), Three-person, solution of 102 120
Game(s), two-person 59 61 63 66 74 80 158
Game(s), Two-person, characteristic function of 169
Game(s), Two-person, constant-sum 76 179 305
Game(s), Two-person, cooperative 113 162
Game(s), Two-person, in characteristic function form 199
Game(s), Two-person, non-constant-sum 159
Game(s), Two-person, non-cooperative 176
Game(s), Two-person, Shapley value solution to 170
Game(s), Two-person, theory of 158
Game(s), unhomogeneous 218
Game(s), value of 33 38 66 77—78 147
Game(s), value of to coalition 40 83
Game(s), weighted majority in 217 243
Game(s), with (without) cores 309
Game(s), with more than two players 14
Game-theoretic analysis 45 124
Game-theoretic analysis, extra-game-theoretical considerations 122
Game-theoretic analysis, levels of 45—67
Game-theoretic analysis, non-game-theoretic specifications 285
Games, theory of, in characteristic function form 53 66—67 137
Games, theory of, in characteristic function form in extensive form 53
Games, theory of, in characteristic function form in normal form 53
Games, theory of, in characteristic function form normalized 86 99 102 111
Gamson, William 291—292 294—295 n316
Gelbaum, B.R. n315
Generality, levels of 50
Geometry 13
Gillies, D.B. n315
Group theory 52
Harsanyi, bargaining model 170 173 175—176 178—222 285 294
Harsanyi, J.C. n315
Harsanyi, solution 179 286 291 305
Hausner, M. 271
Imputation(s) 92 97—100 119—120 137 142 285
Imputation(s) as basis of "reasonable outcome" 114
Imputation(s) as outcomes 96
Imputation(s) as payoff disbursement 150
Imputation(s) in a large market game 201 205
Imputation(s) in a small market game 187
Imputation(s) in Two-person zerosum game 93
Imputation(s), comparison of 146
Imputation(s), constraints on 92
Imputation(s), defined for games in partition function form 149
Imputation(s), egalitarian 135 205—206
Imputation(s), equally divided, stability of 120
Imputation(s), non-dominated 96
Imputation(s), ordering of 94
Imputation(s), set of 92
Imputation(s), simplexes 157
Imputation(s), stable 193 227 309
Imputation(s), stable set of 95
Imputation(s), weak ordering among n312
Infinite regress 11
Infinitely divisible goods 196
Information sets 54
Information, available 68
Interests in conflict situations 96
Interests of players 64
Interests, collective 148 n316
Interests, conflicting 234 307
Interests, conflicts of, psychological aspects of 180
Interests, opposed 165
Interests, opposed diametrically 66 165
Interests, self- 117
International, politics 287
International, politics relations 45
Intersection (of sets) 18 20—21
Irrelevant alternatives, independence from 163 172
Jackson, Andrew 298
Jury (American) 210
Kalisch, G.K. n316
Kannai, Y. n312
Kernel 125 146 157 286
Knowledge about others' preferences 69 see
Left-Right game 73
Left-Right game in normal form 73
Left-Right game, characteristic function of 97
Left-Right game, core of 89
Legislature, a 185 207 211—212 see
Legislature, as a symmetric game 220
Legislature, improper 216
Legislature, simple 210
Legislature, state 211
Legislature, sum of 216
Legislature, weak 216
Lesser of two evils 70
Lieberman, B. 297 n316
Linear invariance 172
Lobbies 216
Logistics 304
Lucas, W.F. 7 156—157 n313—314
Luce, R.D. 7 111 168 194 245 n312—316
Magnitudes 28
Malan, D.W. 7
Management ability 301
Mann, Irwin 244 n315
Market with a monopolist 203
Market, as non-zerosum game 196
| Market, classical 307
Market, large 185 196
Market, price 202
Market, small 185—186 204
Maschler, Michael 122—123 269 290 297 n313 n316
Mathematical concept 11
Mathematical concept, logic 6
Mathematical concept, mode of reasoning 14
Mathematical concept, notation 6 16 25 37
Mathematical concept, operations 32
Mathematical concept, proposition 11 13
Mathematical concept, symbols 12
Mathematical concept, term 11
Mathematical concept, theory 11
Maximin 28 61 242
Maximization of gain 308
Migrations 250
Military, alliances 234
Military, alliances proficiency 302
Milnor, J.W. n316
minimax 61
Minimization of effort 308
Minimum (minimal) Power Theory 291 293—294
Minimum power, principle of 219
Minimum resources, principle of 219 289—290 294
Models 49
money 66 76 see
Morgenstem, O. 6 see
Moves 58
Nash's bargaining problem 168
Nash's bargaining problem, Nash — Zeuthen principle 170 172 n314
Nash's bargaining problem, procedure 162 164 168—169 170—172 178 n314
Nash, J.F. 271 n316
Observation(s) 12 97 285
Observation(s), suggested by game theory 308
One-person game paradigm 302
One-to-one correspondence 30 54
Operation(s) 15 18 23
Operation(s) of algebra 19
Operation(s) of arithmetic 51
Operation(s), binary 24
Operation(s), mathematical 32
Operation(s), routine 67
Operational notation 25
Order of preference 46
Ordered n-tuples 24
Ordered pairs 24
Ordering 29
Ordering, strong 29
Ordering, weak 29 94
Outcomes 53—54 57 63 70 124 308
Outcomes of mixed strategy choices n312
Outcomes, control over 46
Outcomes, equilibrium 111 158—159
Outcomes, expected 56 87 n312
Outcomes, final 49
Outcomes, influence on by coalition 146
Outcomes, intermediate 46 49
Outcomes, intuitive notions about 219
Outcomes, not confined to imputations 115
Outcomes, not dominated by other outcomes 162
Outcomes, possible 94
Outcomes, predicted by -stability model 264
Outcomes, predicted by Shapley value 260
Outcomes, range of 96
Outcomes, restrictions of 125
Outcomes, stable 193
Outcomes, unique 122 175
Outcomes, utilities of 301
Paradoxes 52
Pareto-optimal payoff 171
PARETO-optimality 306
Pareto-solution 305
Pariah 101
Partition function, representation of, value assigned by 147
Partitions 34
Partitions as strategy 238
Partitions, sets of 34
Party discipline 246 250
Payoff(s) 26 53 59 66 70 88 122 159 293
Payoff(s) of a single player n315
Payoff(s), additive 26 n315
Payoff(s), apportionment 66 137 235 293
Payoff(s), deviating from bargaining set 268
Payoff(s), disbursement vector 89 90 119
Payoff(s), disbursements 29 37 89 92 113—114 134 143 146 149 237—238 303 305
Payoff(s), distribution of 134
Payoff(s), equal 134 225
Payoff(s), expected 63 163
Payoff(s), fixed 97—98 100—101
Payoff(s), individually rational configurations 116 120 128 194
Payoff(s), individually rational configurations, departures from 122
Payoff(s), less than value 88 91
Payoff(s), minimum expected 110
Payoff(s), not additive 162
Payoff(s), plane 162
Payoff(s), polygon 160
Payoff(s), pooling of 76
Payoff(s), space 174
Payoff(s), split 101
Payoff(s), stable pair 139
Payoff(s), transformation 86
Payoff(s), unique vector 180
Payoff(s), vector 88—89 111 117
Payoffs, apportionment of 286—287
Payoffs, division of 88 91 126 141 161
Payoffs, equal split of 103 221—222 292
Payoffs, guaranteed by syndicates 173
Payoffs, joint 76 97 147 161 n312
Payoffs, maximization of 82 162 179
Payoffs, minimum of 66 110
Payoffs, the sum of 33 64
Peleg, B. n313
Personal characteristics, minimizing effects of 256
Pivot 243
Pivotal powers (of players) 294
Player(s) 26—27 54 69
Player(s) in coalition with himself 82 120 129 139
Player(s) in equilibrium 136
Player(s) in non-symmetric games 113
Player(s), "hopes" 127 133
Player(s), according to Von Neumann — Morgenstem, Harsanyi 180
Player(s), bargaining position of 132 170
Player(s), bargaining potential of 122 see
Player(s), cooperation of 81
Player(s), counter-objections 118—119 194
Player(s), dictator 212
Player(s), dummy 212
Player(s), expectations of 105 108
Player(s), irrelevance of personal characteristics 163
Player(s), joined in coalitions 34 see
Player(s), loyalty of 146
Player(s), number of 93
Player(s), objections of 117—119
Player(s), objections of, justified 119—121 124 130
Player(s), weak 230
Poker 60
Political, parties 234
Political, patronage 287
Political, process 287
positional notation 71
Power, gradients 251
Power, index 252 see
Power, redistribution 251
Preferences, knowledge about others' 69
Preferences, order of 196
Preferences, scale of 196 199
Preferred outcomes 64 see
Prescriptive behavior theory 136
Pressure groups 237 242—243 303
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