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Anatol Rapoport — Two-Person Game Theory. the Essential Ideas |
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Предметный указатель |
Psychology of playing for money 29
Psychology, applications of 203
Pure science 186 193
Pure strategy see Strategy pure
Raiffa, H. 8 96 115 210 n218 n219 b221
Raiffa’s solution (of the negotiated game) 115—21 211
Rapoport, A. n217 b220 b221
Ratio scale 26 27 28
Rational, analysis 214
Rational, choice 142 (see also “Prudent policy”)
Rational, conflict resolution 213
Rational, conflict, model of 206
Rational, conflict, theory of 145
Rational, decision 57
Rational, decision theory 189
Rational, gambling 13
Rational, opponent 57 139 141
Rational, player 79 139
Rationality 55 103 131 136 139 140—44 205—6 210 n216
Rationality of both players assumed 70
Rationality of goals 213
Rationality of opponent 57 139 141
Rationality, ambivalence of 142
Rationality, collective 131 143 146 209
Rationality, higher order 210
Rationality, humanitarian 212
Rationality, in the context of a zero-sum game 142
Rationality, individual 131 143 146 209
Rationality, levels of 55
Rationality, multi-ordinal meaning of 209
Rationality, mutual perception of 139—41
Rationality, strategic 145
Rationality, “dynamic” conception of 210
Realism 191 n219
Reflexive reasoning 143
Refusal to play 108
Repentance 209
Retaliation 131
Rhind papyrus 74
Rigidity 44
risks 29
Risky choice(s) 36—38
Risky outcome(s) 32 34 36 146 198
Rules 18 47
Saddle point(s) 59—60 69 78—89 115 117 145 194-95 197 204
Sanctions 129 131
Scales of measurement 24—31
Schelling, T. C. 126 127 143 n214 b221
secrets 64 202
Security level(s) 101—2 109—19 124—25 139 141 171—72 178 211 “Minimax”)
Self-defense 208
Self-interest 130
Set theory 7 8
Settlements out of court, negotiated 212
Shapley, L. S. 108 111 b221
Shapley’s solution (of the negotiated game) 108—11 112 121 123 125 170 211
Share of the joint payoff 104 113
Shubik, M. b221
Similarity transformation 27 (see also “Payoffs multiplied
Slot machine 21
Social context 177
Social sciences 6 9
Solidarity 130
Solution(s) 55 89 116 213
Solution(s) of algebraic equations 74
Solution(s) of games with saddle points 79 (see also “Maximin” “Minimax”)
Solution(s) of games without saddle points 79—87 150
Solution(s) of negotiable games see “Braithwaite’s solution” “Nash’s “Raiffa’s “Shapley’s
Solution(s) of nonnegotiable games 128(see also “Equilibrium” “Paradoxes”)
Solution(s) of zero-sum games 78—93 (see also “Maximin” “Minimax)
Solution(s), general 74—76
Solution(s), multiplicity of 214
Stakes 28 29
Status quo point 103—21 124 176 211
Steady state 179
Stochastic learning theories 144
Stochastic process 179
| Strategic analysis 45 68
Strategic analysis, calculation 112
Strategic analysis, conflict 77 205
Strategic analysis, logic 77 137 205
Strategic analysis, mode of thought 214
Strategic analysis, potentials 212
Strategic analysis, principles 190
Strategic analysis, rationality 145
Strategists 190 191
Strategy(ies) 6 39—46 54—62 63—76 104 127 128 162 194—95 202
Strategy(ies), choice of 146 161
Strategy(ies), coordination of 100 140
Strategy(ies), determinate 195
Strategy(ies), dominating see “Dominating strategy”
Strategy(ies), independent (simultaneous) choice of n218
Strategy(ies), mixed (mixture) 63 76 78—87 92 101 112—14 139 145 194—95
Strategy(ies), number of 41—46
Strategy(ies), optimal (maximizing) 78 146 164 192—94
Strategy(ies), prohibited 92
Strategy(ies), prominent 127
Strategy(ies), pure 74 78 101 112 114 145 194
Strategy(ies), randomly chosen 192
Strategy(ies), shift of 180
Strategy(ies), totally (unconditionally) uncooperative 133 137
Strategy(ies), winning 62
Subgame n216
Subjective element 200
Suppes, P. n218 b221
Sure-thing principle 55
Suspicions 209
Symmetrical equilibrium mixture 140
Symmetry 97 126—27 140—42
Tacit collusion 132 (see also “Agreement tacit”)
Termination rule 20
Thrall, R. 9
Threat(s) 97 110—18 119—21 124 126—27 190 211
Threshold effect 156
Torts 213
Transition probabilities 178
Transitive preference relation n214
traps 57
Trial and error 147—51
Trigonometry 23
Trust 157 207 209
Trustworthiness 208 209
Uncertainty 44
Unforeseen developments 44 45
Uniqueness 127
Unit point 96
utilities 22—37 47 96 105
Utilities, 129 161 171 182—84 194 196 201-2 n214
Utilities, assignment of 201—2
Utilities, comparison of 37—38
Utilities, linear with money 192
Utilities, measurement of 38 106 n217
Utilities, numerical 198
Utilities, on the ordinal scale 198
Utility scale 31—37 116 n214 n216 n217
Utility scale, normalized 122(see also “Braithwaite’s solution” “Raiffa’s
Value judgments 187
Value of a game 80—81 90
Values 214
Vicious circle 136
von Neumann, J. 8 13 b220
War(s) 189—90 205 212
Williams, J. D. 8 b220
Zero point 96 107
Zero-sum game see “Games zero-sum”
Zero-sum game, derived from payoff differences 114—19
Zero-sum game, logic of 204
“Best way to play” 15 20
“Cards on the table” 64
“Expectations of expectations” 198
“Fairness” 98 211(see
“Split the difference” 97 109
“Stronger” negotiator 126—27
“Temptation” 129
“Tough-mindedness” 191
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