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| Àâòîðèçàöèÿ |
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| Ïîèñê ïî óêàçàòåëÿì |
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| Levi I. — The enterprise of knowledge |
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| Ïðåäìåòíûé óêàçàòåëü |
 -finite measures 128—131 286 360
Abduction 42—46 49—50
Ability 236—237
Ability and compulsion 239
Ability and serious possibility 244—246
Ability, adverbially modified 241—243
Acceptance 132
Admissible option 96
Analytic reasoning see “Corrigibility”
Anomaly 62—63
awareness 10
Bar-Hillel, Y. 48n
Bayes, T. 297 315
Bayesian conditions or doctrine and conflict 168—210
Bayesian conditions or doctrine, Bayesianism 51 78 84 87 94 95—96 98—100 132 133 135 136 150 152 164—168 207—210 229
Bayes’ Theorem 83—85 125 129 236 289 325
Belief, justified 1
Birnbaum, A. 423n
Bolzano, B. 287
Borel, E. 287
Braithwaite, R.B., xv 234n 370
C(UK) 82
Cantor, G. 287
Carnap, R. 48n 67 78 79 80n 86 89 99 238 243 297 375 424—427
Caution 50—56 137 181
Caution, throwing caution to the winds 56
CD-predicate 248—249
Chance 48 86—87 234—236 250—287
Chance and credal coherence 261
Chance and credal consistency 261—264
Chance and credal probability 234
Chance and the long run 271—274
Chance on single trials 271—273
Chance on single trials and repeatable trials 273—274
Chance, existence of 264—271 392—394
Chance, existence of, Kyburg’s view 376
Chance, predicate 250—252
Chance, predicate, composite 253
Chance, predicate, simple 252
Chance, semantics of 256—261
Chance, semantics of frequency interpretation 256—261 394
Chance, set-up 37n 236
Chance, subjunctive conditionals supported by 276—278
CIL 86 89—90
Classical representation of a decision problem 105—106
Cognitive decision problems 51
Cognitive resource 74ff
Coherentism 86
Commitment 164—168 186—188
Compatibility of evaluations of expected utility 116
Compatibility of evaluations of strong condition of 114
Compulsion 237
Conditionalization and contraction 82n
Conditionalization of one credal state by another 80
Conditionalization, confirmational 81 83—86 216—217 222—225 230—233 289 297—298 383—385
Conditionalization, Dempsterian (D-conditionalization) 385—392
Conditionalization, inverse temporal credal 81
Conditionalization, temporal credal 81 289
conditionals 246—248
Confidence interval estimation 326 422 423n
Confirmational commitment 48 79—83 216—217 289
Confirmational commitment and credibility 80n
Confirmational commitment, logical 86
Confirmational irrelevance 225—233
Confirmational tenacity 82 86 87 99 216
Conglomerability 118 280
Conglomerability, finite 278
Context dependence 47 56 65—67 91—93 315 322 426—430
Contraction 25 33 58 59—62
Contradiction 62—63
Corpus of knowledge 1—2 7 74ff
Corpus of knowledge, contradictory 27—28
Corpus of knowledge, hierarchy of corpora 9
Corpus of knowledge, potential 12—13
Corrigibility 1—5 13—19 59 99
Corrigibility, categorical 7—8
Corrigibility, conceptual 7—8
Corrigibility, degrees of 61—62
Corrigibility, idiosyncratic 7
Cox, D.R. 423n
Credal, coherence 77—78 104 118—119 144 261
Credal, consistency 78 104 118—119 261—264
Credal, convexity 78—79 191—214
Credal, convexity and the multiplication theorem 193—196
Credal, intervalism 197—204 212 375—376
Credal, intervalism, Dempsterian 387—392
Credal, irrelevance 107
Credal, regularity 77 110—116
Credal, states 74
Credal, uniqueness 79 84 87
Cumulative distribution function 327
Curse of Frege 318—319 424—430
de Finetti, B. 78 86 99 109 110 112 114 115 116 118 122 126 129—130 131 210 219n 285 287 392—394
Decision making under uncertainty 98 144—147
Decision making, deliberate 35—37
Decision making, routine 35—37
Decision making, theoretical and practical 72—76
Decision making, under risk 98
Demands for information 34 46—47 180—182
Dempster, A.P. 79 102 200 297—298 325 386n 387n 388n 369 385—392
Density function 327
Dewey, J. xvi
Direct inference 86 144 236 250—287
Direct inference and pedigree theories of knowledge 396—398
Direct inference from composite hypotheses, continuous case 284
Direct inference from composite hypotheses, countably infinite case 280—284
Direct inference from composite hypotheses, finite case 278—280
Direct inference, Fisher’s view 369—375
Direct inference, Kyburg’s principle of 374n 375—385
Direct inference, principle of 254—256 405n
Direct inference, Reichenbach’s view 373—374
Disposition 237—239
Disposition, semantics for 243—244
Dominance, strong 106
Dominance, strong and credal coherence 108—109
Dominance, strong, principle of (SD) 107
Dominance, weak 106 109—112
Dominance, weak, principle of (WD) 109
E-admissibility of options 96—97 144—145
E-admissibility, principle of 96 104
E-undominated option 136
Edwards, A.W.F. 344n
Epistemic utility 50—51 132 180—182
Evidential import 423n
expansion 25 33 34—35
Expansion and likelihood rules of rejection 311—315
Expansion, deliberate or inferential 34—40 137 428—429
Expansion, deliberate or inferential and statistical prediction 274—276
Expansion, routine 34—40 99
Expansion, routine, via appeals to witnesses 37 51—57 400—403
Expansion, routine, via observation 37 399—423
Expected utility 95—96
Expected utility, conditional 112—113
Expected utility, epistemic 135—136
Expected utility, maximizing 51—53 132
Expected utility, principle of 96
Experimental densities 356—358
Fallibilism 8 13—19 34—35 41 57
Fallibilism and free speech 31—32
Fallibilism, categorical 14—15 18
Fallibilism, epistemological 13—14 18—19 70—72
Feyerabend, P.K. 34 58 68—70 427
Fiducial inference 102 325 326 340n
Fiducial inference as summarizing data 367—368
Fiducial inference, commitment to irrelevance 328 331—334 338—339
Fiducial inference, inversion step 328 330—331 337
Fiducial inference, Kyburg’s theory 382—383
Fiducial inference, pivotal step 328 329—330 336—337
Fiducial inference, principle of continuous case 339
Fiducial inference, principle of countably infinite case 335—336
| Fiducial inference, principle of finite case 334
Fiducial inference, principle of, and insufficient reason 335 336 340
Fiducial inference, tame 326 342
Fisher, R.A. 87 90 102—103 294 296 301—302 316 325 335 341 342 343 368—376 382 383
Focal pair 148
Frege, G. 424—428
Frequency principle 346 405n
Gettier problem 29—30
Good, I.J. xvi 79 96 186 187 199 204 208 375
Hacking, I. 37n 102 126 234 242n 297 326 327 329 345—349 354 356—358 360—363 368 404—405
Harper functions 219—221
Harper, W. 219
Harsanyi, J. 149n 150n 175
Higgenbotham, J. xvi
Hilpinen, R. 48n
Hinkley, D.V. 423n
Hintikka, J. 48n 56
Hope level 148
Hurwicz, L. 145n
Ignorance 183—186 315
Ignorance, Bayesian 184
Ignorance, cognitive 183
Ignorance, cognitive, strong 184
Ignorance, credal 185
Ignorance, credal and cognitive ignorance 185
incommensurability 67—68
Independence of irrelevant, alternatives 208—210
Inductive logic 77—78 85—88 98
Informational value 34 45—48 50—51
Informational value and contraction 59—60
Insufficient reason 184 315
Irrelevance see “K-irrelevance” “L-irrelevance” “Conformational “Credal “Stochastic
Irrelevance, principle of 346 347 354—355
Jeffrey, R.C 52 82n 106
Jeffreys, H. 56 78 79 89 90 99 126 127 129 130 297 326 360 375
Joint proposition 347—348
K-irrelevance 374n 377 382—383 395—396
Keynes, J.M. 79 90 183 375
Knowledge as a standard for serious possibility 2—7 71—72 74
Knowledge as true justified belief 1—3 28—30
Knowledge, pedigree theory of 1—2
Kolmogorov, A.N. 110 346 346
Koopman, B.O. xv 79 199 206—207 346 375
Krantz, D.H. 204
Kuhn, T. 34 58 65—70 71
Kyburg, H.E. xv 79 102 199 203 297—298 325 369 374n 375—385 386n 392—398
L-irrelevance 377 382—383 395—396
Lakatos, I. 428
Laplace, P.S. 315
Lehman, E.L. 409—410
Lehrer, K. 54n
Leximin 145
Leximin, admissibility 149 211
Leximin, admissibility and spreads in the odds 154—156
Leximin, optimality 149
Likelihood 84 228 236 289 343—368 423n
Likelihood and deriving posteriors from priors 343—344
Likelihood and fiducial inference 352—354 358—359
Likelihood and rejection 311—315
Likelihood, assumption of uniqueness 229
Likelihood, continuous case 355—358
Likelihood, discrete cases 347—352
Likelihood, HL-likelihood 348
Likelihood, its function in inquiry 345 367—368
Likelihood, law of 102
Likelihood, law of, and insufficient reason 359—363
Likelihood, law of, as a principle of inductive logic grounded in our conception of logic chance 361—363
Likelihood, law of, refuted 366—367
Lindley, D.V. 130 340n 363 366
Long run 419—423
Lorentz, H.A. 63
Luce, R.D. 145 204 209 228n
M-function see “Probability information-determining”
Maximin 98 145
Maximin as pessimistic 149—151
Maxwell, J.C 62
Measuring credence 204—208
Michelson, A.A. 62—63
Mill, J.S. 32
minimax 134 (see also “Maximin”)
Minimax regret 145
Mixed option 162—163 410—413
Morgenbesser, S. xvi 234—235n 237—238
Morgenstern, O. 163
Multiplication theorem extended to the continuous case 123—125
N-predicate 239
N-predicate, explicit 239—240
Nagel, E. xvi
Necessitarianism 89 90—91 93 426
Neyman, J. 37—38n 87 90 102 156—157 293—296 326 404—409 415 419 422—423
Normal science 67—69
Nozick, R. 106
Objectivist inductive logic 87 91 102 144 279—280
Objectivist inductive logic and determination of priors and likelihoods 289—292
Objectivist necessitarianism 102—103 280 292—296
Objectivist necessitarianism and routine decision making 421—423
Objectivist necessitarianism and the relevance of data 296—298 403—408
Objectivist revisionism 103 298 304—324
Objectivity 429—430
Observation reports 37 41
Observation reports, accepting as evidence 399—400
Observation reports, making 399—400
Observation reports, using as inputs in a program for routine decision making 406—408
Observation reports, using as inputs in a program for routine expansion 399—400 413—419
Optimal with respect to expected utility 95—96
Optimism-pessimism criteria 145
Optimism-pessimism criteria, admissible (OP-admissible) 148
Optimism-pessimism criteria, admissible (OP-admissible), and spreads in the odds 154—156
Optimism-pessimism criteria, optimal (OP-optimal) 148
Optimism-pessimism criteria, optimal (OP-optimal), pair 145 (see also “Focal pair”)
Ordering options with respect to strength 138—143
P-admissible option 97—98 137—139 144
P-function 82
P-predicate 239
Paradoxes of confirmation 26—27
Parsons, C. xvi
Pearson, E.S. 37 87 90 102 156—157 294—296 326 404—409 415 419 422—423
Peirce, C.S. 14—18 19 21 22—23 42 70—72 258 422
Perrin, J. 70
Personalism, intemperate 87 91 93 298 426—427
Personalism, tempered 93 298
Pivotal function 329 336
Pivotal function, invertible 331
Pivotal function, invertible, smoothly 336
Pivotal function, irrelevance-allowing 332 339
Plato 171
Popper, K.R. 18—25 31 32 58 67 70—72 219n 427
Possibility, economic 241
Possibility, logical 3 242—243
Possibility, metaphysical 190—191
Possibility, objective see “Ability”
Possibility, physical 241 242
Possibility, relevant 4 112—118 222—225
Possibility, serious 2—5 222—225 236—237
Possibility, serious, and ability 244—246
Possibility, serious, double standard of 16—18 72
Possibility, technological 241 242
Potential answers 45—46
Potential surprise 183
Probability as a science 260
Probability, conditional 104 112—118 217—219
Probability, conditional, as confirmational commitment 218—219
Probability, countably additive 77 104—105 118 121 122—123 125—131 280—287
Probability, countably additive and fiducial inference 336 340 360—361
Probability, credal 3—4 25 48 52 234—236
Probability, de dicto as non-truth-value-bearing 185—189
Probability, epistemological 375
Probability, expectation-determining 48 49 52 104
Probability, finitely additive 76
Probability, improper 126—127 284—287 360
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