Rational choice theory can be replaced as the leading paradigm in political science by the theory of perspective, which argues that how we see ourselves in relation to others sets and delineates the range of options actors find available, not just morally but empirically. The author begins by discussing the basic assumptions underlying the theory of rational choice or rational action, discusses the main criticisms of the theory, and argues that these criticisms, when taken in conjunction with rational choice theorists’ response to them, provide us with a classic Kuhnian example of a paradigm in stress. The author then argues that the debate over rational choice has become unnecessarily acrimonious because of the lack of a viable alternative theoretical structure. Political psychology can provide such an alternative in a theory of perspective on self in relation to others, and she suggests several ways in which this theory will need to be developed as it grows and expands in the manner described by Kuhn. She concludes that rational choice works well for certain kinds of political phenomena, but does not work in all circumstances. The discipline’s attention should now focus on trying to understand and to specify the conditions under which rational choice theory will apply, and on distinguishing them from situations and conditions under which perspective may provide a more valuable theoretical framework.