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Название: Infectious Greed: Restoring Confidence in America's Companies
Авторы: Nofsinger J.R., Kim K.A.
Financial scandals have led to a fundamental crisis in the American corporate system: investors believe they have been thoroughly betrayed by the managers, boards, accountants, and investment advisors they once trusted. The fundamental challenge is to restore confidence, but finger-pointing and tougher laws simply won't be enough.
John Nofsinger and Kenneth Kim begin with an insightful assessment of what really happened: how executive compensation systems have led unethical and greedy behavior, and why monitoring systems and regulators failed so completely. Next, they identify powerful reforms that realign incentives to actively promote integrity and discourage malfeasance. In so doing, they offer the first real prescription for restoring investor confidence in both the short- and long-term—and for getting the U.S. economic system back on track.
Investor trust: the U.S. economy's 'secret ingredient'
Why restoring investor confidence is crucial to restoring economic vigor
Why the corporate scandals really happened
Greed doesn't explain everything
Who did what, and how they did it
CEOs, boards, auditors, analysts, investment firms: a realistic performance assessment
Not just laws: a market-driven approach to reform
Incentive-based reforms that will really work
Restoring investor confidence: a tough, realistic, incentive-driven plan.
Enron. Andersen. WorldCom. Tyco. Adelphia. Corporate scandals have shaken investor confidence more than any event since the Great Depression. Without investor trust, American capitalism can never regain the vigor that hasdynamic economy. In Infectious Greed, two financial experts offer a powerful new explanation of why the scandals happened—and realistic solutions that leverage the immense power of markets and self-interest.
John Nofsinger and Kenneth Kim show how the system came to provide massive incentives to greedy CEOs, ignorant boards, willfully blind auditors, and dishonest investment houses. They also show how those 'bad' incentives can be replaced by even more powerful incentives for honest stewardship and counsel—and how the right incentives will do more to restore investor trust than politicians ever could.