There are, then, ways in which philosophers can help resolve practical issues by applying theory to them. But the benefit is mutual. Having taken part in a great many discussions, in working parties and seminars, with people from other professions who face moral problems (doctors and psychiatrists, for example) I have been struck by the way in which, in trying to apply theory to these problems, one gains confidence in certain parts of the theory but secs the need for improvements in others. It often happens in such discussions that I am not the only philosopher present. There may be, for example, somebody also who is, not a non-descriptivist Kantian utilitarian like me, but a descriptivist intuitionist deontologist, perhaps pretending to be a Kantian. These theoretical differences are largely, though not wholly, independent of any differences on the practical issues. Before we start arguing, our unphilosophical opinions may or may not coincide. But when we do start arguing, it is likely to turn out that I am able to give Kantian utilitarian reasons for my opinions, and the other philosopher is not able to give any reasons at all. He just appeals to the consensus of those present, which, unless the working party has been stacked, may not be forthcoming. When he does produce reasons which seem to have any force with those who did not initially share his opinions, they tum out to be utilitarian reasons- appeals for example to the bad consequences of some policy.