This volume brings together many of the world’s leading theorists of free will
and philosophers of law to critically discuss the ground- breaking contribution of
David Hodgson’s libertarianism and its application to philosophy of law.
The book begins with a comprehensive introduction, providing an overview
of the intersection of theories of free will and philosophy of law over the last fi fty
years. The eleven chapters that follow divide into two parts: the fi rst fi ve address
libertarianism within the free will debate, with particular attention to Hodgson’s
theory, and in Part II , six contributors discuss Hodgson’s libertarianism in
relation to issues not often pursued by free will scholars, such as mitigation of
punishment, the responsibility of judges, the nature of judicial reasoning, and
the criminal law process more generally. Thus the volume’s importance lies not
only in examining Hodgson’s distinctive libertarian theory from within the free
will literature, but also in considering new directions for research in applying that
theory to enduring questions about legal responsibility and punishment.