Much of the research work that I have done in philosophy has
focused on problems within the fields of epistemology, philosophy of mind,
philosophy of language, and logic.1
Hence, in this book, I chose to focus on
expanding the arguments that I presented in my 2017 article entitled
“Hintikka’s Socratic Epistemology Meets Gettier’s Counterexamples”
(henceforth SE)2
published in Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy Vol. 31, No.
3.
When I wrote SE, I have a simple goal in mind: to apply Jaakko
Hintikka’s Socratic Epistemology to Gettier’s counterexamples in order to
see if the method of inquiry implicit in the former can have significant
effects on the latter. In particular, I was interested in its possible
implications to the Gettier Problem (which as we all know is an open
problem in contemporary epistemology).